



SPANISH ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS

Prof. Noura Ahmed, Department of Sociology, University of Karbala

&

Dr. Youssef Mahmoud, Institute of Physics, Alexandria University, Egypt

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the institutional framework of the Spanish accounting reform of 2007. Adopting institutional theory as a theoretical framework, we have identified the pressure groups that have had a significant weight in the reform process and the direct implications of their influence on the White Paper of 2002 and on the General Accounting Plan of 2007. To carry out the analysis, following DiMaggio and Powell's concept of isomorphism, we have classified the different interest groups based on their ability to influence the process . The empirical evidence that supports our research was obtained from the interviews carried out with several participants in the process . _ This information It was complemented with the analysis of official documents and opinions published in the press and in specialized magazines by different actors in the process or people affected by it. Our conclusions suggest the dominance of coercive isomorphism in the reform, at both the national level (the role of the executive, through the Accounting and Audit Institute) and supranational level (mainly the European Commission). We also observe the influence of other regulators, such as the National Securities Market Commission and the Bank of Spain, which, with their experience in their fields of action, played a role of “ leaders ” in the process in an example of mimetic isomorphism . We also appreciate the influence of normative pressures with the participation of different groups of experts (eg, academics). Finally, it is important to



highlight the changing and dynamic nature of these influences throughout the accounting reform process.

Introduction

Accounting regulation is the result of the political, economic and social context in which a national or supranational reality is immersed . The accounting standards that make up said regulation are, therefore, the result of certain historical and cultural conditions (Hopwood, 1994). As previous studies have shown, governments, institutions, large corporations or professional associations, among others, can, through their intervention in the process of issuing standards, influence its final result (Gélard, 2004 ; Zeff , 2011; Giner, 2014). The works of Zeff (1995, 1999, 2002, 2012) constitute a fundamental reference in relation to the study of how pressure groups influence the development of accounting standards. The study of changes in accounting regulation, of the bodies that approve them , as well as their impact , is critical for the advancement of knowledge in this area (eg, see Zeff, 2012) .

The objective of this work is to analyze the institutional framework responsible for the changes in Spanish accounting regulations during the first decade of the 21st century . Based on the framework defined by institutional theory, the aim is to delimit the pressure groups that have had a significant weight in the accounting reform process and the implications of this influence on the White Paper of 2002 and the subsequent commercial reform , with the General Accounting Plan (hereinafter, PGC) of 2007 as the main exponent . The objective and *modus operandi* in the preparation of these documents were very different. While the 2002 White Paper was designed as an opportunity for reflection and intellectual criticism, the reform that led to the approval of the 2007 PGC was conceived as a technical process whose involved had to focus in the development of specific accounting standards . Thus, the first document established the bases of the reform, while the second materialized them in accordance with the recommendations of the first in harmony with our legal system. To carry out the analysis , we have classified the different interest groups

based on their capacity to influence the process according to the isomorphism typology of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) . The empirical evidence consists of the results of the interviews carried out with different participants in the process and the opinions of these and other people linked to the process and published in official documents, press and specialized magazines .

Our analysis suggests the dominant role of coercive pressures , both at the national level, through the decisions of the executive branch channeled mainly through the Institute of Accounting and Audit of Accounts (ICAC), and at the supranational level, mainly the Commission European (EC). We also observe the influence of other regulators , specifically the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and the Banco de España, who, with their experience in their fields of action (listed companies and credit institutions , respectively), act as leaders of the process in an example of mimetic isomorphism . Finally , different groups of experts and professionals (eg, associations of academics and auditors) have influenced the process via normative isomorphism. It should be noted that these influences are not static but, as previous studies suggest (eg, Carpenter and Feroz, 2001), they evolve over time.

With this work we ~~hope~~ first of all , to deepen our knowledge about the accounting reform process in Spain in order to shed light on its development . In this sense, the evidence and analysis offered here is intended to complement previous work that has described the « official history » and the « internal history » of the accounting reform (Gonzalo-Angulo, 2014 , 184) providing an analysis of the influence of the different interest groups in the reform process . To this end, and in line with research work on changes in accounting regulations carried out in the Anglo-Saxon environment , we adopted institutional theory as a theoretical framework . Its application to the Spanish context is novel , and with this we intend to provide evidence on the role of

institutions and interest groups with characteristics different from those present in Anglo -Saxon countries , which we consider to be of no veto to the institutional approach . Finally , it is important to highlight that our results lead to a greater understanding of the institutional framework that has governed accounting regulation in Spain in the first decade of the 21st century and is expected to remain relatively stable in the future . _ _ _ _ _ In this sense, this work also provides relevant information for the analysis of future changes in accounting regulation in Spain .

We have structured the work as follows. In the next section we present the foundations of institutional theory as well as a review of previous literature on changes in accounting regulations. Below we describe the main milestones of the Spanish accounting reform of 2007. In the fourth section we describe the methodology used in the research. Next we analyze the degree of influence of the different pressure groups in the accounting reform process . We finish the work with the discussion of the results and conclusions.

Theoretical framework and literature review

In this work we adopt institutional theory as a theoretical framework (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In the area of accounting , the institutional approach has proven valuable when investigating the adoption of accounting standards and the accounting regulation process in both Anglo-Saxon environments (eg, Carpenter and Feroz , 1992, 2001; Collin, Tagesson, Andersson, Cato and Hansson, 2009; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Fogarty, 1992; Fogarty, Heian and Knutson, 1991; Suddaby, Cooper and Greenwood, 2007) as in other contexts (eg, Larson, 2002; Silva, Lima and Graig, 2014; Touron, 2005). Silva et al. (2014) provide evidence of how Institutional pressures influenced the decision of Portuguese companies to voluntarily adopt international accounting standards. In the Spanish case , although a notable number of works have adopted institutional theory to study the



adoption of management practices (eg, Carmona and Macías, 2001 ; Larrinaga, Núñez and Gutiérrez, 2008), to date this approach It has not been used to examine changes in accounting regulation .

The starting assumption of institutional theory is that institutions, understood as " social structures composed of cognitive, normative and regulatory elements that provide stability and meaning to social behavior " (Scott, 2001 , 48), exert strong pressures on institutions. organizations so that they act rationally. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that individuals and groups of individuals with interests

In organizations, they expect those who direct them to use the most efficient means for them to achieve their objectives. It happens that in many contexts both the means and the objectives are ambiguous. The dilemma then arises between the technical environment, which emphasizes the effective and efficient control of organizational activities, and the institutional environment, related to the conformity of organizations to social expectations and pre-established rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983). In order to understand why organizations are increasingly homogeneous, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) derive from institutional theory the concept of isomorphism, defined as the degree of conformity of organizational structures to institutional environments. In this work we focus on institutional isomorphism¹, referred to the competition that occurs between organizations to achieve political power, social acceptance and institutional legitimacy. Processes such as the standardization of organizational activities and practices (eg, the adoption of accounting standards) occur precisely because organizations wish to obtain institutional legitimacy (Meyer and Scott, 1983; Richardson, 1987). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify 3 mechanisms that They result in an isomorphic institutional process : coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism.

Coercive isomorphism occurs from the formal and informal pressures exerted on an organization by others on which it depends, as well as the expectations of society (eg, the regulatory framework) . As Carpenter and Feroz (2001 , 571) point at, coercive isomorphism is linked to the resource dependence. The State and all its organizations have the capacity to exert coercive pressures through multiple mechanisms, from the imposition of fines to the formulation of new regulations (eg, Giner, 1997; Touron, 2005). Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) provide a good example of the influence of coercive isomorphism in their analysis of the budgeting process. These authors find that certain groups and individuals, such as state governors, use their power to force compliance with certain

institutional rules when their personal interests are at stake (Covaleski and Dirsmith , 1988 , 563). Normative isomorphism is linked to the pressures exerted by professional groups in order to normalize organizational actions. That is, it refers to the struggle of professionals to define working conditions and methods and control the production of producers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Although originally focused on the pressures of professional groups, this type of isomorphism can be extended to other environments (for example, to pressures exerted through training). An example of the influence of normative isomorphism on accounting decisions is provided by Carpenter and Feroz (2001) . These authors argue that institutional pressures for _ _

adoption of US GAAP² by state governments in _ _ _ _

United States were driven by the training received by accounting bureaucrats and by the growth of professional associations such as the *Government Finance Officers Association* (GFOA), which played a very active role in the dissemination of certain financial management practices in the scope of state governments. Finally , mimetic isomorphism has to do with the existence of uncertainty, since this encourages the imitation of the practices adopted by those organizations with a greater degree of success and legitimacy . The imitation process has _ _ as

¹ DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish between competitive isomorphism and institutional isomorphism . Competitive isomorphism is related to the market and linked to efficiency . It is relevant , therefore , to study environments in which free competition exists.

² United States accounting standards , using Anglo - Saxon terminology US GAAP (*Generally Accepted Accounting Principles*) .

objective is to reduce uncertainty and identify the best course of action given the institutional environment . The study by Tournon (2005) provides evidence on the

influence of mimetic isomorphism on decisions related to the adoption of US GAAP in a sample of French companies.

The works that have applied the concept of isomorphism to explain the process of adoption of accounting standards and practices provide evidence of the joint action of the 3 types of isomorphism and their variable nature over time (eg, Carpenter and Feroz, 1992 , 2001; Collin et al., 2009; Silva et al., 2014). The works of Carpenter and Feroz (1992; 2001) They highlight the relevance of the 3 types of isomorphism to understand the decision to adopt certain accounting practices and the moment of their application in the field of public administration . Carpenter and Feroz (2001) demonstrate that coercive institutional pressures acted as drivers for the early adoption of US GAAP in those cases where financial pressures existed . Without However, in the case of late adopters , the pressures linked to normative isomorphism were much more important. It can be concluded, therefore , that the pressures linked to the different types of isomorphism change over time depending on the institutional environment (see Carpenter and Feroz, 2001 , 567) . Out From the United States, it is worth highlighting the work of Silva et al. (2014) , which adopts the institutional approach to analyze the voluntary adoption of international accounting standards (IAS) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS) by part of Portuguese companies. Their results suggest that companies voluntarily adopted IFRS for strategic reasons , including the objective of increasing their legitimacy vis-à-vis third parties and reducing environmental uncertainty.

Different works have adopted an institutional perspective to understand the process of formation and operation of regulatory bodies, as well as the process of formulating accounting standards (eg, Fogarty, 1992; Larson, 2002; Roberts, Dwyer and Sewwney, 2003; Zeff, 1995, 2002). Larson (2002) , for example, adopts institutional theory to analyze the legitimacy of the *International Accounting*

Standards Committee (IASC), predecessor of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). Among the interest groups , the accounting profession stands out , represented by auditing firms , professional associations and regulators . Larson finds evidence of mimetic isomorphism in the procedure adopted by the IASC for the discussion of the regulations, emulating the processes of other already legitimized regulators . Zeff's work on political lobbying in the development of accounting standards (eg, Zeff, 2002), even without explicitly adopting the institutional approach, provides interesting examples of the political pressures to which organizations such as the IASB are subject . . Regarding the IASB, highlight the work of Giner and Arce (2012) on the influence of pressure groups on the draft of the standard

« Share - based payments » (IFRS 2). The authors identify 2 differentiated interest groups : preparers and consultants, on the one hand, and users, regulators and the profession, on the other (Giner and Arce, 2012 , 684). Regarding the degree of influence, the authors conclude that it is not possible to identify a dominant effect on the part of any of the groups, therefore suggesting that the IASB 's standards development process is pluralistic.

The institutional framework of the 2007 accounting reform

Several works have shed light on the accounting reform process in Spain (eg, Gonzalo Angulo, 2003; Tua Pereda, 2006 ; C a ñ ibano and Gisbert, 2008) . Tua Pereda (2006) , for example, provides some interesting reflections on the change in orientation of our accounting system towards an approach based on financial information that characterizes regulation .

international. In this section we briefly describe the process of adoption and adaptation

of the IAS / IFRS to Spanish regulations _ Below we identify the different pressure groups that participated in the process. In order to facilitate subsequent analysis, we have classified the different groups according to their incidence predominant in the different types of isomorphism.

Process philosophy _

We can place the starting point of the reform process at the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, in which it was agreed to implement a plan that called for the adoption of measures aimed at improving the comparability of the states. financials of listed companies . In June 2000 , the Commission published the document « The European Union (EU) strategy on financial reporting: The way forward » (European Commission , 2000), in which established the deadline of 2005 for all listed companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with international regulations .

The conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, together with the document mentioned above , led to the approval of the Regulation.

ment No. ° . 1606/2002, of July 19 , 2002 , relating to the application

of the IAS / IFRS, in which officially listed companies were definitively required to prepare their consolidated annual accounts in accordance with the IFRS as of January 1 , 2005 (Regulation 1606 , 2002 , article 4) . In the process of adopting the _ international regulations by listed companies, therefore, there was no degree of decision-making autonomy on the part of the Spanish standardizing bodies (loss of regulatory ~~sovereignty~~). However , Article 5 of the aforementioned Regulation left in the hands of each Member State the possibility of imposing, or not , the application of IFRS as the base regulatory body of the financial *reporting* to unlisted companies, both in their individual and consolidated accounts; that is, it opened the possibility of maintaining sovereignty regulatory agency in unlisted companies or groups. In this

sense, Spain made the decision to develop its own regulations, inspired by international ~~regulations~~ and consolidated accounts of unlisted companies . It is precisely on this point that our work focuses attention . The Spanish regulator could have stuck to ~~leading~~ _ _ _ _ _ direct interference with European regulations , avoiding carrying out accounting reform . _ But as several works point out (eg , C a n ñ ibano and Gisbert , 2008) , this could have caused problems derived from the strong relationship that exists in Spain between ~~tax~~ and accounting, and the potential " image of legal uncertainty " caused by the lack of a national General Accounting Plan (hereinafter , PGC) (C a n ñ ibano and Gisbert, 2008 , 18). With this, the regulator decides to undertake a process that begins with the taking of a Spanish position regarding the dilemma posed by the Regulation for the accounts . individual and consolidated companies of unlisted companies (IFRS versus national accounting standards) and concludes with the approval of the PGC of 2007. During this period, we can identify 2 stages:

- *Stage 1. Taking a position and White Paper* . In March 2000 the ICAC _ published in its official Bulletin no. ° . 41 a study of the level of comparability between the Spanish regulations and those ~~is~~ by the IASB . _ _ _ This document was intended to be a “ necessary element of reflection for the future of accounting standardization ” (BOICAC no. 41 , 2000, 27). Subsequently , the Ministry of Economy commissioned a Commission of Experts to prepare a report with recommendations . mendations to address the reform. As C a ñ Ibano points out _ _ _and Gisbert (2008) , the creation of this commission had the objective of «knowing first-hand the opinion of users, preparers of financial information, academics, auditors and other interested third parties, on the effects of the future Community regulation in our accounting system » . This phase began on March 16 , 2001 with the ~~creation~~ of a commission in which around a hundred experts in different fields

related to financial information participated for more than a year . The conclusions of said commission were approved by consensus ³ and published in the document « Report on the current situation of accounting in Spain and basic ~~its~~ to address its reform » , known as the White Paper on Accounting (Gonzalo Angulo , 2002a) . _ The recommendations of the White Paper can be grouped into 3 blocks : a) the general ones on the future ~~of~~ accounting in Spain ; _ _

b) those of a technical ~~one~~, on the valuation and presentation of the financial statements , and c) the institutional ones, related to the infrastructure of accounting information in Spain (Gonzalo Angulo, 2003). We consider this phase to end in 2003 with the Spanish decision , following the _ recommendations of the White Paper , to ~~replace~~ Spanish accounting law standards (PGC) in individual annual accounts ⁴ , although gradually bringing our regulations closer to international standards (see Law 62/2003 , 2003) . . Law 62/2003 represents the first reform of the Spanish accounting system ~~if~~ force until then ⁵ .

• *Stage 2. Commercial Reform Law and preparation of the 2007 PGC .*

~~and Law 2003, Debería~~ administrative and social order measures, can be considered the first step in the reform of Spanish accounting legislation . A period of document preparation then begins and working groups are appointed for the reform of commercial legislation that frames and protects the new PGC. In 2005 , the ICAC established a new working group in charge ~~of~~ the _ _ preparation of a draft PGC. The process culminates in February 2007 with the publication by the ICAC of the first draft of the new PGC. 9 months pass from the first draft of the PGC until its final approval on November 16, 2007. During this period, with the parliamentary processing of the legislation, the accounting profession experienced a very intense debate that emerged both in the Congress of Deputies and in the Senate as well as in specialized forums and in the economic press.

The chronology of the most relevant events of the Spanish accounting reform since 2000 is ~~part~~ in Annex 1.

Identification of pressure groups

For our analysis we identify the different groups of agents and institutions involved in the process of preparing Spanish accounting regulations and whose ultimate ~~goal~~ is to influence the standards (Giner, 2014 , 147). The origin , academic training and _ practical experience of the agents with influence in the process have evolved proportionally to the degree of sophistication of our society. Thus, in the first milestones of accounting standardization (creation of the Accounting Planning Institute [IPC] and preparation of the PGC of 1973) we could say that the only significant pressure group in accounting matters , and of a coercive nature , was

³ According to what the President of the Committee of Experts, José Antonio Gonzalo Angulo , informed us , there was only one final vote , which was never held because everyone agreed with the content, including José Luis Cea, although he later He recently published his dissenting opinions (see Cea, 2002, 2005). On some occasions the President would simulate a vote to know which way to go. " The shots were going on " and the only one that was complicated was the one made regarding whether it was recommended that the consolidated accounts be prepared under IFRS principles , in any case (whether the groups were listed or not). It is important to highlight that 100 of the 105 recommendations were implemented .

⁴ Groups without securities admitted to official listing may choose to apply _ the IFRS without return or the PGC.



5 This law modifies the organic structure of the ICAC through the creation of the Accounting Council .



Technology Journal of Management , Accounting and Economics (TECH)

ISSN: 2311-3995

Vol. 4 No. 1 (2016)

the inspection body of the Ministry of Finance (tax inspectors and sub-inspectors), a fact supported by the close link between accounting and taxation .

The panorama became more dynamic in the accounting reform of 1990, fundamentally due to the entry of Spain into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 and the consequent development in commercial regulations of the guidelines contemplated in the ~~data~~ European paths that led to the birth of a new commercial-accounting law with different objectives from tax legislation . In this stage we identified 3 national pressure groups : the one corresponding to the inspection bodies of the Ministry of Finance; academics through the IPC and members of the Spanish Association of Accounting and Administration (AECA), and another supranational group ~~partly~~ by European institutions . We have to wait until the first decade of the 21st century to provide the accounting standardization process with a great democratizing and expansive, where different groups participate with varied interests and with different capacities for influence.

In this work we focus on the analysis of the influence of the pressure groups that have participated in the preparation of the most important documents in the last Spanish accounting reform : ~~the~~ White Paper and the PGC of 2007. We are going to group interest groups based on the type of influence they are expected to exert on the process. Specifically , we use the isomorphism types of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) . The starting point has been the identification of those responsible for the working groups of the White Paper ⁶ . Next we determine where your type of influence lies. That is, if this is derived from your authority in the regulatory framework (coercive isomorphism), of their role as professionals and experts (normative isomorphism) or of their ability to act as leaders of the process and, therefore , subject to monitoring by part of others (mimetic isomorphism).

Coercive isomorphism. In this category we include pressure groups that, given their

ability to enact laws, regulations or regulations, favor the institutionalization of certain practices (Touron, 2005). As Giner (1997) points out , legislation , both national and supranational, has a significant influence on accounting decisions even before said regulation becomes mandatory . _ Within the groups with power to exert coercive pressures we include the following:

- *ICAC* (Institute of Accounting and Audit of Accounts). This autonomous body, dependent on the Ministry of Economy and Finance ⁷ , has, among others, powers related to « the carrying out of technical work and proposal of the PGC adapted to the EU directives and the laws that regulate these matters » (ICAC Regulation, 2011). It is, therefore , one of the accounting regulatory bodies in Spain with the capacity to issue accounting standards.
- *Other accounting regulators* . In addition to the ICAC, 3 other organizations Regulators have powers in accounting matters and the capacity to issue accounting standards: the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), with influence over listed companies and institutions related to investment activities; the Bank of Spain , which has the capacity to establish accounting regulations for financial institutions, and the General Directorate of Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP), with powers related to the supervision of insurance entities. Finally, regarding accounting in the public sector, we include the General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE) as the fourth regulator .

⁶ See Gonzalo Angulo (2002a, 15) .

⁷ The Ministry of Economy and Finance does not maintain the same name over time ; We have used the one in force at that time.

Executive Branch . In this group we include the Government and, in particular, the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The influence of the executive branch can occur via the ICAC (described above) or through other linked organizations that indirectly participate in the process such as the General Directorate of Taxes (DGT), dependent on the Ministry of Economy and Finance (fiscalists), and the General Codification Commission (CGC) , a higher collegiate advisory body in the preparation of pre - legislative tasks and linked to the Ministry of Justice (mercantilists) .

- *Legislative Branch* . In this category we include the groups involved profited from the process through legislative means through their participation in Congress and the Senate. Specifically, we consider the contributions and influences of the different parliamentary groups.
- *EU institutions* . _ We consider it necessary, given its capacity ability to coercively influence the adoption of certain accounting standards, including the potential influence of European institutions , such as the European Commission (EC).

Normative isomorphism. This category includes those groups with the capacity to influence the process thanks to their recognition as bearers of knowledge and professional experience. That is, we consider the influence of representative groups of different professions that participated directly or indirectly in the reform process. Specific:

- *Professional associations of auditors*. Auditors play a fundamental role in generating confidence in the information in the financial statements. Their experience as expert professionals in accounting matters and audit procedures guarantees their ability to influence the process of developing new accounting regulations. In this category we include the 3 auditing corporations existing in

Spain at the time of reform ⁸ : the Institute of Certified Accountants of Spain and the ICJCE), the Registry of Auditor Economists (REA), dependent on the General Council of Colleges of Economists, and the General Registry of Auditors of Spain (REGA) , dependent on the Superior Council of Colleges Officials of Commercial and Business Graduates.

• *Academic associations* . Here we include different associations of a professional and private nature with experience related to accounting regulations. Specifically, we consider AECA ⁹ , an entity that " has played a complementary role at the regulatory level with the publication of numerous documents on the accounting treatment of some specific items and has important support from the professional , academic sphere and even institutional, since the Spanish accounting regulator has taken into account ~~one~~ of its developments in the finally approved legislation » (Zorio , 2004 , 53) . We also take into account the Spanish Association of University Professors of Accounting _ _ _ _ (ASEPUC) , which brings together Accounting teachers from the Spanish University , and the Spanish Association of Management Accounting (ACCI) ¹⁰ , which represents teachers and managers

⁸ In 2013, the number of corporations has been reduced to 2 after the merger of the General Council of Economists of Spain and the Superior Council of Official Colleges of Commercial and Business Graduates.

⁹ This Association brings together academics and professionals ; However , in this article

But, we have decided to treat it as an academic interest group , to classify it in a single group, otherwise it should also be in " other professional associations . "

10 This Association does not currently exist , it was merged into the Spanish Confederation

of Directors and Executives (CEDE). As in the case of AECA, it was not a purely academic association either ; However, we have also decided to group it in this way for the purposes of the methodological structuring of the article.

They aim to contribute " to the promotion of improved quality in the management and direction of Spanish companies . "

• *Other professional associations* . In this heading we include dis-ink associations of professionals related to the commercial and tax areas, as well as financial advisors who participated in the process. For example, in this group the Registry of Tax Advisory Economists (REAF), the Spanish Association of Finance Executives (AEDEF), the Professional Association of Accounting and Tax Experts of Spain (AECE) and the Institute of Financial Analysts (IAF).

Mimetic isomorphism. We consider in this category those groups and agents that, either due to their relevance in the market, or due to the existing social perception of their role as leading agents in processes of change and transformation , have the potential to influence the transformation process of the accounting regulations via mimetic isomorphism. Specific:

• *Large auditing firms*. Previous work has identified the role of large audit firms as sources of mimetic isomorphism in the case of the adoption of certain accounting practices by companies and in the origin of transnational regulation (eg , Suddaby et al. , 2007). Although their influence can be channeled via auditor corporations (normative isomorphism), their influence can also be determined by their commercial interests and influence on the market (Suddaby et al., 2007) and linked, therefore , to

an influence of a mimetic nature . In our case, we consider the influence of the 5/4 large audit firms in this process ¹¹ .

• *Companies and business associations* . As representatives

From the business sector we include the ~~part~~ influence of associations such as the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE), the Círculo de Empresarios and the Superior Council of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and ~~Spain~~ of Spain .

• *Other international organizations* . We consider here regulators

~~fundations~~ (for example, the influence of French accounting regulation on Spanish accounting regulation in its beginnings) and institutions such as the IASB . We consider that they can influence, via mimetic pressures, the process of adopting certain decisions about the new accounting framework.

Finally , comment that the different pressure groups , although classified according to the 3 possible sources of isomorphism , can act in such a way that different forms of isomorphism are identified in their influence. For example, in the case of the group called " Other accounting regulators " that appears as a source of coercive isomorphism, it could potentially affect via pressures of a mimetic or normative nature (Touron, 2005 ; see also Bealing, 1994; Bealing, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1996).

Methodology

As has been demonstrated in previous research on the role of accounting elites in accounting standardization , the case method is the best possible way to extract knowledge of the processes that lead to the formulation of accounting standards (eg, Jönsson, 1988) . . For the analysis of the In the case of the accounting reform in Spain , we have obtained information through a series of interviews with 14 personalities directly or indirectly involved in the process .When selecting the sample, it was intended that the interviewed would have had an active participation in the

process of elaboration and approval of the regulations . The interviewees are, therefore , first -rate professional experts , endorsed by their professional career and who, in addition, occupied a relevant position in the reform process . Therefore , They can offer a well - founded opinion about the topics discussed in this ~~work~~ as well as about the functioning of the Spanish accounting elite , of which they are part . From an initial list of 20 names , 13 people were selected ¹² who actively participated in the reform process and who were willing to be interviewed. Among them are _ several university professors , partners of auditing firms , representatives of the ~~Bk~~of Spain , professional associations and the ICAC , as well as other professional experts .

The interviews have not been open in nature but could be described, in the words of Kahn and Cannell (1957, 149) , as " a conversation with an objective . " In order to introduce the conversation, the purpose of the interview was explained to the interviewees in order to offer them a clear description of the objective of the research and their role in it. Likewise, they were given guarantees that their opinions They would be taken into account but that, for the sake of confidentiality, their opinions would not be revealed with reference to the specific person who had issued them. In the interviews, the following thematic blocks were discussed: a) motivation to be part of the different work groups; b) special memories, coming from participation in the process of developing accounting standards ; c) description of the work system ;

a) assessment of the 2007 PGC that arose from the work carried out ; e) assessment of the hierarchical relationship between Spanish and international regulations ; _ _ _ _ f) perception of the different pressure groups , and g) assessment of the discussion and final conclusions on topics such as the conceptual framework, fair value or amortization of goodwill, among others. In turn, this general interview scheme was broken down into more specific questions about each of these large blocks. We took notes during the interviews and, when requested, we presented our transcript of the

interviews to the interviewee . The pattern followed for the interviews is presented in Annex 2 . _

The existence of a general interview scheme has served as a basis for the subsequent coding of the data. The data was coded manually . This can have the deficiency of loss of precision in searching for references through keywords. However, we believe that ~~in~~ the characteristics of the interviews and the design of empirical research , we understand that the mere count of concepts is not enough to control the rich typology of aspects, both technical and sociological, that arise from the interviews.

The evidence obtained through the interviews was complemented with other documents such as information published in the press, in specialized magazines and official documents of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Regarding the analysis of the degree of influence, we measure it from the participation of the different interest groups in the commissions responsible for the preparation of the White Paper and the subsequent commercial reform that culminated with the approval of the PGC of 2007. This report - tion, nuanced and complemented by the analysis of the documents resulting from the process , has helped us classify the level of influence of the different pressure groups based on their degree of participation and intervention in making key decisions in the process . In turn , the consideration of « key decisions or

11 Arthur Andersen until 2002, and Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers .

12 At the suggestion of one of the reviewers of the article, a new interview was carried out in order to capture the opinion of a Spanish representative in accounting bodies at the EU level.

"fundamentals " has been obtained from the opinions of those interviewed and from the analyzes carried out on the reform.

Analysis of the degree of influence of the different pressure groups

Analysis of the influence of pressure groups in the preparation of the White Paper

Figure 1 shows the different groups that participated in the process of preparing the White Paper , qualifying their degree of influence depending on the number of participants from each group in the Commission of Experts. Following the classification described above, each of the groups is identified based on their expected capacity to exert pressure via coercive, normative and/or mimetic mechanisms.

As can be seen from this description based on the number of participants in the Committee of Experts , the most important pressure group we would expect to be the accounting regulatory authorities in Europe and Spain (the EU and the ICAC , with ~~cap~~ ability to exert coercive pressures), followed by the executive branch , auditors, professionals and other accounting regulators (linked to different types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative). At a third level we would find academics (normative isomorphism) and finally the participation of business associations (mimetic isomorphism) , who a priori would be expected to have a lower level of influence on the final conclusions of the White Paper . Below we analyze to what extent this description based on the presence of the different groups in the Commission of Experts fits the influence process perceived in our analysis.

The creation of the Commission of Experts to prepare the White Paper was justified by the need to follow the strategy

accounting announced by the EU (BOICAC no. ° 45, 2001, 6; López-

Combarros, 2002). This aspect makes the EU the most relevant institution when it comes to explaining the process of changing the accounting framework in Spain. Several of the interviewed representatives of the group « Other accounting regulators » express this, literally arguing that « the real pressure group was the EU and the 2002 Regulation ». That is, everything was basically defined by the EU regarding the adoption of international regulations, so that we can consider the EU as the fundamental driving force of the White Paper (López-Combarros, 2002) thanks to its coercive power. Especially when previously, at the time when the *International Organization of Securities Commissions* (IOSCO) recommended the adoption of international regulations, an accounting *task force* had already been created in charge of studying the compatibility of IFRS with the directives of the EU.

The decision to adopt IFRS was , however , a conflictive aspect for some of the participants in the group of experts . Thus, opinions are expressed contrary to " submission to the Anglo-Saxon IFRS accounting model " , emphasizing above all the role of the British and Dutch in this process . Others recognize the failure of European directives that resulted in the adoption of IFRS, an idea that one of the interviewees literally summed up by stating that it was " impossible to regulate in Europe . " As proof of this failure , it is worth mentioning that it took a decade to prepare the 4th Directive of the _ EU before its approval in 1978 _ and about 7 years for the approval of the 7th Directive in 1983 .

one of them: the CNMV with the *Committee of European Securities Regulators* (CESR) and the committee of European regulators in charge, among other functions , of coordination between securities regulators , and the Bank of Spain with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors ¹³ . _ In relation to the Bank of Spain , the interviewees _ _ They commented that their representatives proposed very pragmatic positions, with opinions such as " either the IAS are applied or they are not applied . "

It is important to highlight that the Bank of Spain , through Circular 4/2004 , modified the accounting regime of credit institutions, adapting it to ~~the~~ new accounting environment . derived from the adoption by the EU of IFRS ¹⁴ . _ _ _ To illustrate the degree of influence of this group we can consider one of the central points of debate in the working group: the unification of accounting regulation. Specifically, the possibility of creating a single body in charge of all accounting regulation called *the Accounting Regulatory Committee was considered.*, the majority opinion of all groups being that there should be a single regulator in the future (Gonzalo Angulo, 2002a , 367). This proposal, however , was not accepted due to the refusal of the Bank of Spain , as explained in recommendations 71 and 72 .of the White Paper . The Bank of Spain wanted to continue with its status as accounting regulator , which was considered " basic for the exercise of prudential supervision entrusted to it by ~~law~~"(Gonzalo Angulo , 2002a , 367) . The capacity of the Bank of Spain _ _ to impose its criteria against the majority on a crucial issue in the future standardization of accounting regulation demonstrates its power and influence on the conclusions and recommendations of the White Paper.

It is reasonable to think that the influence of the CNMV and the Bank of Spain is determined by the evolution at the European level of the regulations relating to their areas of action .These contributions represent an example of behavior based on mimetic isomorphism , importing novel ideas and debate at the European level to the national level. In this case, the influence of these groups The role of regulators does not come so much from their coercive power but from the legitimacy of their opinions as experts and leaders of the process in their areas of action - in the case of the Bank of Spain , it was advanced through Circular 4/2004 ; In the case of the CNMV , expected that the adoption of IAS /IFRS for listed companies would occur in 2005. The ~~inter~~work of both regulators and their status as first movers allow us to *conclude* that their influence on the process was mimetic character.


Our analysis suggests that the group made up of academics would be at the same level of influence. Academics have actively participated , and from the beginning , in the accounting harmonization process in Spain . _ Since the creation of the CPI and the publication of the PGC in 1973, which marked the incorporation of Spain to modern trends in accounting standardization (see Cubillo -Valverde, 1973), There is authentic involvement of the academic world in the process . Thus, Cubillo-Valverde (1976, 19) already highlighted the « magnificent task carried out by researchers and students of business economics and in particular of accounting as a science; " They have managed to support the defining principles of the PGC on the purest logic . " Several interviewees highlight the notable activity carried out by academics, contributing their experience and ability to analysis as *input* to the White Paper preparation process. One interviewee literally expressed that " in this country , throughout life , academics have been One of the interviewees even speaks of " failure of normalization. " European accounting » .

At a second level we put the influence of the " Other accounting regulators " group , specifically the Bank of Spain and the CNMV . These organizations were working very actively at that time with the European institutions representing each ¹³ In 2011 the CERS was replaced by the *European Security and Markets Authority* (ESMA). In the case of the DGSFP, it was in contact at the European level with the *European Committee of Insurance and Pension Fund Supervisors* .

¹⁴ However , according to some authors, there could be divergences between what established in Circular 4/2004 and the IFRS adopted by the EU (eg, regarding dynamic provisions; see Can˜ibano and Herranz, 2009).

ICAC
coercive

White book





Executive

coercive

Auditors

normative

Big Four
IGAE
corporations

AECA
ASEPUC
ACODI

CEOE
Cámaras de comercio,

¹ REAF, AEDAF, AECE

² Institute of Financial Analysts

Spanish Association of Finance Executives _

Figure 1. Influence of pressure groups depending on the number of participants in the White Paper Commission of Experts . _ _

Source: own elaboration .

those who have been concerned about accounting standardization more than in any other country . Proof of the ability of academics to influence is that the 7 subcommittees created for the work of the White Paper were chaired by university professors . Also comment that, in the opinion of some interviewee participating in the process, the academy « aesthetically had to be there » , regardless of its real contribution to the process. Among the different academic associations represented in the formal commissions , the most important role was that of AECA. It was logical that AECA represented a prominent influence group given its role in the international harmonization process since its creation in 1979—in June 1979 the Study Group was created of Accounting Principles and Standards. AECA played a fundamental role in the adaptation of European directives on accounting matters to Spanish regulations during the 1980s and in the issuance of standards for voluntary application by companies (C a ñ ibao and Ucieda, 2005 , 17; Gonzalo Angulo, 2002b , 17). As Giner (1998, 462) comments « [p]robably its greatest contribution took place before the accounting reform of the late 1980s , since its recommendations , not only documents

but also opinions, contributed to filling the existing normative and doctrinal void . » In fact, several interviewees refer to AECA as a “ de facto lobby ” with an important weight in the entire process. On the other hand, and in the opinion of other interviewees, ICAC's concern that " the entire world » could have diluted the role that AECA, given its track record, could have had. The influence of academics in general and AECA in particular is fundamentally determined by their perception as bearers of experience and knowledge in accounting matters , representing an example _ of normative isomorphism .

At this same level we would have the influence of the executive via mercantilists and fiscalists. These professional groups, belonging to the General Codification Commission (CGC) and the General Directorate of Taxes (DGT), were represented in the Commission of Experts and acted as interveners, watchdogs and constitutional guarantors, ensuring commercial law and company law. Therefore, we could say that its influence occurred silently by observing the fit of the new framework in commercial and tax legislation and safeguarding tradition. This was the perception regarding the vigilant role played by mercantilists and fiscalists:

« . . . All those affected by this reform process are aware that if the reform to be carried out alters the trust that the commercial and tax legislator has placed to date in the valuation principles and standards included in the *Commercial Code* , *TRLSA* , *PGC*, sectoral adaptations and other development provisions, the immediate consequence would be the abandonment by said sectors or branches of Law of the general accounting model , and the consequent approval of special accounting standards , with the setback that this situation would bring with it from different perspectives. Among others, the loss of credibility in the figures provided by accounting, and the corresponding increase in costs in companies when having to comply with different *accounting* regulations » (Ros-Amorós, González-García and

Pérez-Iglesias, 2006; Pérez-Iglesias, 2006 , 265).

We also include at this level the influence of the expert representatives of the large companies that participated in the process. Several of those interviewed, from different groups, argue that the influence of highly valuable experts from large companies such as Repsol and Telefónica was notable. In some way, they acted as a counterweight to the previous group, the academics, contributing their experience from practice . professional. On the other hand, some of the interviewees commented that the actions of the CEOE, as a representative of the business world, were quite belligerent when it came to removing accounting burdens from companies or defending the interests of SMEs, but they did not debate technical issues , so ultimately , their performance in the process can be considered very limited .

At a third level would be groups of other professionals — specifically , auditors and large audit firms . _ _ _ In the case of the auditor corporations, their participation in the preparation of the White Paper was limited despite the fact that the 3 associations were represented as institutions in the Commission of Experts (the ICJCE, the REA with the representation of the Council General of Economists and the REGA with the Higher Council of Official Associations of Commercial Graduates of Spain a). C a ñ ibano and Uceda (2005) highlight the low profile of auditor corporations in the process: « the contribution of professional associations of auditors to the regulatory framework , in relation to The issuance of accounting standards and implementation guides of the standards established by law is not significant » (C a ñ ibano and Uceda, 2005 , 17) .

Finally we consider the influence of the executive via ICAC. The perception of the interviewees regarding the influence of the ICAC is summarized in that it played a tutelage role , ensuring the organization and maintenance of the working groups . The interest of the executive, and therefore of the ICAC, was to create a group of experts

that include all parties involved . _ It was considered necessary to generate internal debate with the different agents involved « so that the reform of the accounting regulations that , where appropriate , was considered necessary to address, is carried out on the basis of timely reflection and consensus » (López-Combarros , 2002) . Several of those interviewed emphasize this point. One comments, for example, that it was important "for everyone to be there" with the objective of "pacifying and preparing the ground for the reform that was going to come later." In this sense, we can consider that the ICAC practically did not intervene in the process. Rather, in the opinion of the participants interviewed, « He let himself be guided by the work commissions " and " let things be done . " The ICAC dedicated itself to providing material resources so that the White Paper could be prepared; However, according to the perception of some participants, " it took a long time to prepare " , even though it would have been desirable for it to have been ready before the 2002 EU directive.

Figure 2 summarizes the analysis carried out on the influence of the different groups in the preparation of the White Paper . Our analysis suggests that the process starts with the push by the EU and the requirements established regarding the adaptation of national accounting regulations to international standards (isomorphism coercive).

As shown in Figure 2 , the groups with the greatest influence were the group of " Other regulators " (Banco de España and CNMV) , whose participation in international debates and their experience in their fields of action ~~and~~ legitimacy to their opinions (mimetic isomorphism); the group of academics, especially through AECA and their ability to influence given their track record as the main agent in matters of ~~accounting~~ standardization in Spain ; the mercantilists and fiscalists, monitoring compliance with Commercial and Tax Law, and the representatives of large companies, who according to the interviewees provided experience and knowledge to the process (normative and coercive isomorphism). Finally, we consider that auditor associations and



large audit firms, as well as the executive via ICAC, participated in a very inactive way. In the case of the ICAC, its position was clear: try to involve all the agents involved in the accounting standardization process and facilitate the process by providing the necessary resources. As Gonzalo Angulo (2003) points out , the approach adopted by the Commission of Experts was “ to make a mix between the extremes represented by tradition and novelty so that progress is better assimilated [. _ _ _ _ . .]. Firstly , coherence with the past , which implies _ many other things, but it can be symbolized in the maintenance of the PGC as the accounting standardization instrument par excellence and , therefore , the determined will to maintain a single accounting model » (Gonzalo Angulo, 2003 , 11-13).

Analysis of the influence of pressure groups in the preparation of the General Accounting Plan of 2007

As in the process of preparing the White Paper, the EU exerted a decisive influence on the 2007 PGC, as this was the response proposed in the White Paper to eliminate the differences between local financial reporting regulations and the international in individual companies and groups without listed securities. In addition to the coercive influence of the EU, it is important to highlight the role of the IASB (formerly IASC). Already in the 1990s, the EU decided, instead of starting a new standardization process, to join the IASC to achieve the objective of harmonizing accounting among member countries (Giner , 1998) . So, The EU resolved, after an analysis of the compatibility of international standards with European Directives, to adopt the standards issued by the IASB after their approval by the Commission. Therefore, we can conclude that the IASC/IASB had an indirect influence on the preparation of the PGC via the EU.

In addition to the EU, the group with the greatest influence in the process of preparing the PGC was the executive through the ICAC. Since the completion of the White Paper in September 2002 , the ICAC took the reins of the process and adopted a series of decisions aimed at incorporating international regulations into the Spanish regulatory framework . From From the ICAC 's point of view , the White Paper was perceived as a " broad and enriching debate " (Ros-Amorós et al., 2006 , 52). The White Paper Expert Committee identified 3 possibilities regarding how to carry out this process . The first option was to maintain the Spanish ~~regulations~~, their *status quo* , except legally . determined by the EU —as in the case of listed groups that must follow international regulations . _ _ This option was considered not viable. The second option was to directly apply international regulations to all entities - in a similar way to the decision of the Bank of Spain regarding the credit institutions . This option was ruled out in the White Paper recommendations . Finally, it was proposed to

reform the PGC, thus reinforcing the path of convergence towards international regulations throughout the private business sphere. This was the recommendation of the White Paper that it was decided to implement for the individual and consolidated accounts of non-listed groups that thus they decided:

« the Commission recommended the application of the Spanish regulations , Commercial Code , TRLSA and its development provisions , which should nevertheless contain assessment and presentation criteria compatible with the adopted IAS /IFRS and its Conceptual Framework ,with the in order to enable the annual and consolidated accounts to be prepared from a set of homogeneous accounting criteria » (Ros-Amorós et al., 2006 , 52). Consequently , the spirit of the reform can be summarized as follows : insofar as it corresponds to the regulations imposed by the EU, in our capacity as a Member State , it will be directly applicable as established by the regulation emanating from Europe (since approve via Regulation). In what is not mandatory, international standards will be adapted to our legal -commercial framework , through a new PGC. In this sense, it is worth highlighting the influence of the mercantilists and fiscalists , who , as explained in the previous section , ensured that the accounting reform fit into the regulatory framework.

On November 27 , 2002 , the ICAC created a Working Group in charge of preparing a document that would serve as a basis for the position .

ble reform of commercial legislation on accounting matters (BOICAC no. ° 52, 2002, 7) . ICAC 's next significant step is not planned .

continues until the publication of the Resolution of December 23 , 2004 ¹⁵ , which modifies the composition of the working group




15 The 2 - year *impasse* that occurred between 2002 and 2004 is probably due to the change in Government that took place in March 2004. During this period only

Legislative

coercive

EU IASB
coercive mimetic



Executive
coercive

Other accounting regulators
coercive mimetic

CNMV BE

DGS and FP IGAE

Figure 2. Influence of pressure groups on the White Paper based on the results of the analysis . _

Source: own elaboration .

created in 2002—specifically, the original members were joined by representatives from other regulators, such as the Bank of Spain , the CNMV , the DGT and the DGSFP (BOICAC no. ° 60 , 2003). It should be noted that in this 2 year period the Bank of Spain issued Circular 4/2004 , by which " the accounting regime of Spanish credit institutions was modified , adapting it to the new accounting environment derived from the adoption by the EU of the International Financial Reporting Standards " (Circular 4/2004, 2004) . The assignment of this Working Group culminated with the Draft Accounting Reform Law , in which the recommendations of the White Paper , the opinions of the members of the Accounting Consultative Committee (committee that is part of the governing bodies of the ICAC) and the opinions of the Council of State were taken into account (Ros-Amorós et al., 2006) . In May 2006 , the Project of Law on the reform and adaptation of commercial legislation on accounting matters for its international harmonization based on EU regulations, which establishes that the objective of the ICAC is " to make the financial reporting framework that Spanish companies must comply with compatible with the waves in the formulation of their individual annual accounts, with the Commission 's accounting regulations » (Accounting Reform Bill , 2006) . With this project, the parliamentary process begins in the Congress and the Senate , which will culminate with the approval of Law 16/2007, of July 4 , on the reform and adaptation of commercial legislation on accounting matters for its international harmonization based in EU regulations (Accounting Reform Law , 2007) .

There are 2 smaller movements related to the accounting reform : _



a) the resolution of 12/19/2003, by which a group of translators of the IFRS (BOICAC no. ° 56, 2003), and b) the modification of the group of translators, with the incorporation of a new member, on 01/07/2004 (BOICAC no. ° 58, 2004).

16 104 amendments were presented in Congress, 31 of which were approved. In the Senate, the number of amendments presented was 123 amendments, of which 21 were approved.

This Law will be developed through the PGC, which will be approved by Royal Decree on November 16 , 2007 .

The regulatory development process (preparation of the PGC) begins with the ICAC Resolution of July 12 , 2005 , which gave rise to the creation of the Working Group in charge of preparing a

document that serves as the basis for the reform of the PGC of 1990 (BOI- CAC no. ° 62, 2005). In the composition of this group it was attempted that

The different groups related to economic-financial information were represented , including ~~representatives~~ of the IGAE, the Bank of Spain , the CNMV, the AECA, the ASEPUC, the ICJCE, among others. In total, the group is made up of 30 members: the regular members representing the different interest groups were 13, and the same number of substitutes, plus 12 members directly proposed by the President of the ICAC, and 5 members representing the ICAC. On September 22, 2005, the ICAC, in order to speed up and make the process more effective , created 10 work subgroups by subject— from a subgroup in charge of the *Conceptual Accounting Framework* to another in charge of *Business Combinations , Joint Ventures . and consolidation* — , each of the subgroups with a speaker (BOICAC no. 63 , 2005).

Furthermore, the ICAC established a deadline for the completion of the work : December 15 , 2005. In the opinion of Pérez Iglesias, at that time Secretary General of the ICAC, « the first conclusion [. . .] is the firm will of the Government to maintain individual annual accounts under national sovereignty (Commercial Code, Public Limited Companies Law and other development provisions , in particular, the General Accounting Plan [PGC]) , without therefore reviewing the decision that the legislator adopted at the time through the eleventh final provision of Law 62/2003 , of December 30 , on tax measures , administrative and social order , in harmony with the recommendations included in the White Paper on Accounting » (Pérez -Iglesias,



2006 , 17-18). In short, what is intended is to reach a dual model, similar to the one that the countries around us seemed to have adopted and are adopting in

that moment (Pérez-Iglesias, 2006 , 17). The PGC of 2007, as a text that develops the content of the Accounting Reform Law , is finally approved with the Royal Decree of November 16 , 2007 .

The ICAC used its power as a competent entity —coercive isomorphism— to impose their criteria on everything related to the development of the PGC. As one of the interviewees linked to the ICAC indicated , " the reform of the PGC was necessary and the IFRS model was the only possible one " , and in his opinion the entire process was a great job on the part of the ICAC, showing at all times « its vocation of public service » , although in the opinion of some experts the ICAC decisions regarding the PGC « incorporated almost all the postulates of the White Paper » and therefore the opinion of all interested agents was taken into account. However, others harshly criticized the process. This is the case of the representative of the Popular Parliamentary Group in the Economy and Finance Commission , who considered that « the PGC has been treated in an obscurantist way, because the Institute [ICAC] does not has accepted any suggestion. Even all types of information have been denied » (Expansión, 2007b).

Different pressure groups , such as the ICJCE ¹⁷ or parliamentary groups commentators, criticized the fact that a draft of the PGC was published in February 2007 when the Bill was still being processed (Diario de Sesiones, 2007; Partida Doble, 2007 , 16). Other pressure groups, however, applauded the initiative, such as the Higher Council of Official Colleges of Commercial Owners of Spain and the General Council of Colleges of Economists of Spain , which They expressed that "The accounting profession values positively that the ICAC has published the first draft of the Accounting Plan on the Autonomous Body's website. This response constitutes a way of addressing the many requests made by different professional sectors and, among them, the Councils themselves,

Colleges that form it and their specialized bodies, such as the REA/REGA » (Informe Proceso, 2007). On the part of the ICAC, the response was clear:

" At no time has he been an obscurantist . " What happens is that " the Institute [ICAC] is not the one to transfer disaggregated opinions of the Administration to a third party " (statements of the Deputy Director General of Standardization and Accounting Techniques to Expansión, 2007b). Furthermore , the ICAC and the Executive highlighted that the deadline for the public information process was in this case 2 months, when it was usually 15 days; In the words of the Minister of Economy, the process has been « participatory » and « open » (Expansión, 2007a) 18 .

One of the issues highlighted by those interviewed has to do with the very existence of the ICAC and the regulation model; that is, the traditional dispute between private and public regulation. Thus, at the extreme we would have the case of those who considered the ICAC as an " institutional anomaly . " This was the position of the auditing profession - specifically , the president of the ICJCE in statements to *Cinco Días* argued that " we have been heard but not heard " , and that the "ICAC supervision system _ _

17 The President of the ICJCE expressed his disagreement with this way of proceeding. It must be taken into account that the ICJCE represents multinational auditing companies , and although the PGC could provide new opportunities for accounting advice , in relation to the audit it implied greater costs for the auditor that could not be be passed on to the orders, among other reasons, because this process coincided in time with the beginning of the financial crisis. In any case , it is worth noting that a few weeks after the PGC came out , the ICJCE sent the ICAC a hundred queries about the PGC to clarify issues that were little developed



in the text, but that also They were a covert protest . The ICAC Accounting Council spent between 2 and 3 months answering these queries .

18 An antagonistic reference to this is that of the IASB , whose discussion processes of

Drafts are much longer in time and more transparent (see, for example, the case of the IFRS 2 Standard on share-based payments in Giner and Arce, 2012).

is surpassed. It lacks regulatory activity and clear professional support » (Cinco Días, 2007d). Furthermore, as stated by one of the interviewees, in the process " there was no trust in the specialists . " Other interviewees showed a preference for mixed regulation: « professionals do private regulation but with a vote of quality of the public institution » , as happens in the audit area , with a greater degree of self - regulation. At a second level would be the legislative power, which played an important role in the development of the commercial reform and the preparation of the PGC of 2007. In the opinion of some of the interviewed, there was a strong *lobby* in Parliament regarding some critical aspects of the plan. One of these points was related to the PGC for SMEs - as some interviewees highlighted, some adopted the following position : « If the SME plan does not come out , nothing comes out » . The pressure on the government came mainly from the Popular and Catalan Parliamentary Groups , which They defended the need to develop an SME plan . Thus, the spokesperson for the Popular Parliamentary Group commented: « the spokesperson for the Socialist Parliamentary Group is aware of the concerns of the affected sectors [. . .] that there had to be a plan for SMEs . Against commitments _ _ _ acquired by the ICAC, the general plan is already posted on the Internet [. . .]. The plan for SMEs is not mentioned at all , and we said that there is no reason for SMEs to be forced to carry out a plan that is designed solely and exclusively for a certain type of company » (Diario de Sessions, 2007 , 4). For his part, the representative of the Catalan Parliamentary Group argued that "we are facing an issue that we consider to be of vital importance. We are

going to incorporate as a system, a general plan of accounts for SMEs that is abbreviated, that is simple [. . .] » (Diary of Sessions, 2007 , 3). Finally , the government committed that the preparation of the Royal Decree approving the SME plan would have special monitoring by the parliamentary groups , although it was a task that should be in the hands of the

ICAC (Cinco Días , 2007c). Some of the interviewees showed their disagreement with the initiative to develop a specific plan for SMEs, commenting, for example, that " it would have been enough to unify fiscal and accounting criteria . " Finally, it should be noted that an amendment presented by the socialist group, as a result of strong pressure exerted by political groups and business organizations, delayed the entry into force by one year . of the PGC, initially planned for accounts closed as of January 1 , 2007 (García-Lorenzo, Velar-Martín and C a ñ adas- Sánchez, 2009 , 18; Expansión, 2006).

At this level we would also have the group of other regulators, such as the Bank of Spain or the CNMV . Both had a very active participation in relation to financial instruments, given that it was one of the areas that presented the most options and, on the other hand, was best known. That is, the ICAC benefited from the experience in the area of these professionals. In both cases, they had an influence that we could consider mimetic, acting as leaders of the process in a similar way as in the case of the White Paper . Our analysis suggests that the influence of the academy in the process of preparing the PGC is fundamentally given by its participation in the White Paper. During this period, the contribution of this group occurs mainly through the production of documents that are used as *input* for the design of the new PGC - æexample of its contribution of resources is that almost all the speakers of the working subgroups created by the ICAC are professors . Among the members of the group of There are different academic opinions regarding the process of preparing the PGC. Some of the interviewees from this group showed their disagreement with the ICAC approach , and thus commented that " there were missing development standards that were made but that did not appear in the text ", and who did not agree on an advanced PGC based on market values , which seemed especially inappropriate for SMEs . In their opinion , these rules are , literally, " for business. "




Legislative

coercive

EU IASB

mimetic



Executive

coercive

Other coercive mimetic accounting regulators

CNMV BE

DGS and FP IGAE

Accountants , economists , mercantilists, fiscalists ¹ Financial analysts ²

Figure 3. Influence of pressure groups on the commercial reform and the preparation of the 2007 PGC based on the results of the analysis . _

Source: own elaboration .

sas without a country » , in clear reference to the *global players* . However , other interviewees commented that the approach was good .

" especially for SMEs to raise our accounting level . " _ _ Another criticism of the PGC by the academy , as one of the interviewees commented , is that it was a " very succinct text , requiring a lot of additional explanation for its development , " and that " there were inexplicable anomalies , not so much due to lack of detail but due to lack of principles (solid foundations) » . Furthermore, it is considered that " it is the most complex in the EU : daring and desire to standardize ourselves with the main countries in the world . " As appeared in an editorial in *Técnica Contable* , « Spain was the country early riser in the EU in the entire accounting reform process » (Accounting Technique , 2007 , 3). While some criticized the haste in preparing the PGC, one interviewee commented that « there has been plenty of time to undertake a reform already announced by the EU in the year 1995 » . One of the valuable aspects that was perceived from the academy was that

« The reform had effects on the way of understanding the profession: application of professional criteria and judgment; that is, greater commitment and responsibility of the professionals involved » , as argued by one of the interviewees . Another aspect that one of the interviewees from the group of academics valued positively is the fact of achieving the « total independence of accounting with respect to the treasury and the legal form of the transactions[. . .] done something heroic in a country with strong legal and fiscal influence » .



In general, there was very little participation and influence from other interest groups (eg, auditors, professionals and companies). However, they did publicly show their opinions, generally negative or very negative, regarding the PGC development process (Olleros Rodríguez, 2008). As in the case of the White Paper, the influence of the accounting and auditing profession was very limited. Here, however, some of the professional associations showed their disagreement with some of the decisions made by the ICAC. For example, in the interviews with the representative of the ICJCE he appeared to " disagree with the accounting duality recommended in

the White Paper and established in the PGC » . The ICJCE harshly criticized the attitude of the ICAC throughout the process: «It is not a problem of its professionals, which has infinite value , but of its model , anchored in 1988 and designed to defend itself against auditors . We demand an update, and the model to follow could be that of the Bank of Spain » (Actualidad Económica, 2008). Now, the ICJCE's attitude softened over time : «There has been a clear flexing in relations with the ICAC . During the processing of the reform, we were harsh and critical; But in this subsequent process, the regulator has verified that the judgment of professionals can be trusted. Thus, the dialogue with the ICAC has been improved and the standards that have to come to complete the PGC will be agreed upon» (Expansión, 2008). Regarding the large auditing firms, they also expressed their disagreement with certain aspects of the new plan, specifically, in relation to the cost of maintaining two accounting frameworks in the case of companies that belong to listed groups (Cinco Días, 2007b). Others , such as the former president of the SEPI, argued that the ICAC had not had the necessary resources: «probably the ICAC has not been accompanied by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the dissemination, help and assistance effort that a reform of these characteristics requires » (Cinco Días, 2007a). Finally, comment that the high number of consultations published in the BOICAC after the approval of the PGC is an indicator of the lack of collaboration and participation of other interested groups in the entire process. Consultations to the ICAC skyrocketed starting in 2008 , doubling and even tripling those published ¹⁹ years ago _ above: while the average number of consultations for the period 2000-2007 is 14 consultations per year, for the

¹⁹ José Antonio Gonzalo Angulo, President of ICAC at that time, told us that unpublished queries also tripled. Specifically, during the years 2008 to 2011, the ICAC was answering between 800 and 1,100 queries per year.

Table 1

Analysis summary : pressure groups , influence and type of isomorphism

pressure group	Influence. Points to highlight	Dominant type of isomorphism
<i>White Paper</i>		
European Union	Institution driving the process	Coercive
Other regulators (Banco de España, CNMV)	International experience in its areas of influence; legitimacy as process experts and leaders ; « <i>first movers</i> »	Mimetic
Academics (at the individual level ; AECA)	Present in the subcommittees; experience and knowledge	Normative
Executive mercantilists fiscalists	via « Silent » influence ensuring and compliance with changes in legislation _ _ _ _ commercial and tax	Normative
Large companies (Repsol, Telefónica)	Experience and knowledge from professional practice _	Mimetic
Auditors	Limited influence despite all 3 associations being represented _ _	Not significant

	of auditors	
Executive via ICAC	Contribution of material resources and coordination	Not significant
<i>PGC 2007</i>		
European Union and IASB	International regulations adoption process _ _	Coercive/Normative
Executive via ICAC	Creation of working groups and subcommittees ; preparation of drafts; process control ; setting deadlines _ execution _	Coercive
Legislative	Pressure on parliament at critical points (eg , SME plan) by certain parliamentary groups _ _	Coercive
Other regulators (Banco de España, CNMV)	Notable influence in their areas of expertise; eg, instruments financial	Normative
Academics (at the individual level ; AECA)	Influence derived from his participation in the White Paper	Normative
Large companies (eg, Repsol, Telefónica)	Limited influence	Not significant
Auditors	Limited influence , although with criticism in the media	Not significant

Source: own elaboration .

period 2008-2012 is 32. Figure 3 summarizes the analysis carried out showing the degree of influence of the different interest groups on the commercial reform process and the approval of the 2007 PGC.

As can be seen, the greatest influence in this case came from the EU and the executive via ICAC, which thanks to its coercive power led the process by establishing the agenda, creating working groups and making autonomous decisions regarding the publication of drafts. At a second level we identify the influence of the legislative power , specifically , the influence of parliamentary groups in the discussions in the Congress and Senate, which led to far-reaching decisions in accounting regulations, such as the decision to develop a plan for SMEs. We place the academy at the same level, although in this case its influence was determined by its previous participation in the preparation of the conclusions of the White Paper and by its contribution to the provision of resources that the ICAC used as *input* for the preparation of the PGC (results of the subcommittees). Its influence would be an example of regulatory isomorphism , like the influence of the Bank of Spain and the CNMV, thanks to the contributions of its experts . Regarding the other groups, we can say that their influence was minimal, although in this case they were especially active . in criticisms of the process (for example , the opinions of large audit firms or professional associations of auditors) . Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis, identifying the pressure groups , the keys to the degree of influence and the predominant type of isomorphism . in the process of preparing the 2002 White Paper and in the process of preparing and approving the 2007 PGC .



Discussion of results and conclusions _

In previous studies (eg, Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Collin et al., 2009), our analysis shows how different types of isomorphism are present simultaneously. Comparing the institutional framework of the White Paper with that of the commercial reform and approval of the 2007 PGC (figs . 2 and 3 ; table 1), we observed several significant differences that are explained below.

Firstly, the coercive role of the EU, emanating from the obligation to adopt IFRS for groups with listed securities (Regulation 1606 , 2002), is transformed into a mimetic influence in the process of commercial reform and approval of the PGC of 2007 materialized in the option that the organization itself gives to the Member States to adopt or adapt the international regulations in individual accounts and the subsequent recommendation of the White Paper to prepare a text adapted to IFRS . In this sense, our results coincide with Tua Pereda (2006, 147) when he argues that the EC's position is " the proximate cause of the reform, perhaps the necessary impetus to carry it out . "

In relation to the degree of influence of the executive branch, we can say that it also evolves from a last-level authority to a first - level one , motivated by the different role of the ICAC in the preparation of both texts. While in the White Paper the ICAC acted as a conductor allowing an open process and with broad institutional representation (academics, auditors, businessmen, executive power, professionals and national and supranational regulators), in the process of commercial reform and approval of the PGC of 2007 , he played the role of director , making the main decisions of the process, and executive agent, with the preparation of drafts and final documents. It is also worth highlighting in the last process the specific weight that legal principles such as the reservation of rights had . law in the final drafting of the PGC or the decision to incorporate the conceptual framework in the commercial code . In short , the influence of the ICAC, especially in the case of commercial reform, illustrates the influence of coercive isomorphism in the design of the new accounting infrastructure .The power Legislative, for its part , did not participate in the White Paper by its very nature but did play a notable role in the commercial reform and the approval of the PGC of 2007 (second level influence), fundamentally due to the

pressures that conditioned - approved the simultaneous approval of the PGC and the PGC for SMEs in 2007 and that the latter included a simplified regime.

The contribution and influence of academics was greater in the White Paper (second level) than in the commercial reform process and approval of the PGC 2007 (third level), and this despite the great involvement of academics in the preparation of this document. The reasons for this were the specific weight of their reasoning when opting for one or another option of the internal standards . . . tionals , while its role in the PGC 2007 was more than valuable of its Spanish accounting tradition . We can say that its normative influence lost weight in the final decisions that gave rise to the new PGC.

The auditing profession (corporations, large auditing firms , and other auditors) did not play a decisive role in either process ; However , its degree of influence on the White Paper was higher than that of the commercial reform process and approval of the PGC of 2007, probably due to the more technical and legalistic nature of this last norm and therefore a clear vocation , especially in the case of the *big four* , towards an internationalization of our traditionally more didactic and less interpretive accounting regulations . Similarly , business representation went from a second- level degree of influence in the White Paper , with great contributions from our leading companies , to a fourth level in the process of commercial reform and approval of the PGC of 2007, derived, as in the previous case, from the more minimalist and formal nature of this last norm that was directed very closely by the ICAC , with some pillars already established in the White Paper . Likewise, the weight of other professionals was greater in the White Paper than in the process of commercial reform and approval of the PGC 2007, perhaps because once the foundations were laid in the conclusions of the White Paper , the execution work was entrusted mostly to representatives of the ICAC .

Based on our analysis of the opinions expressed by the interviewees and the

additional documentation , the political, historical and cultural conditions that explain the main influences detected in the White Paper and in the subsequent accounting reform that gave birth to the PGC of 2007 , are the following:

- The European spirit of Spanish society , culturally rooted since the end of the 19th century , formally instituted on January 1 , 1986 with the entry of Spain into the EC and indirectly endorsed at the polls that same year when Spain decided to continue in NATO , it is the main influence in the entire process of the accounting reform analyzed, represented by the coercive isomorphism of the EU (Regulation 1606, 2002)

and the IASB mimetic fundamental in the adaptation of the regulations through the PGC of 2007. Such a Europeanist spirit was already reflected in the first PGC (PGC of 1973), when said plan was inscribed in the prevailing currents of accounting standardization at that time . international. and in particular from the EEC. Some of the experts interviewed expressed the importance of have a good European accounting standards committee , which, although it was considered, was discarded especially due to pressure from the British. However , not everyone agreed in their assessments when considering the IASB " a club with the large corporations of the English-speaking world " , in the words of one of the interviewees.

- The maintenance of national sovereignty , reflected in respect that all the interviewees expressed the Spanish mercantilist and fiscal tradition manifested in the entire commercial reform and in the PGC of 2007 as its main product . This tradition, reflected in the executive branch (ICAC, CGC and DGT), advocated for the individual accounts of entities did not finance the principle of reserve of law and the subsidiary non-application of IFRS , implementing a dual system, like the majority of the rest of the EU countries .
- The public tradition of developing and approving standards



accounting faithfully reflected by strong *lobbies* in the parliamentary process of commercial reform and the approval of the PGC of 2007 (second level influence) that managed to anticipate the application of the SME Plan before the publication of the corresponding international regulations by the IASB. This aspect reflects the great weight that this type of companies has in the Spanish business fabric and whose interests were channeled through legislation thanks to the support of different parliamentary groups . The decision to legislate the _ _ _ _

regulations on business combinations that were delayed until the approval of the counterpart by the IASB. These differences suggest that, although a certain mimetic behavior is observed with respect to the IASB, in certain aspects the executive decided not to wait and act autonomously in an example of coercive isomorphism.

• In the opinion of some interviewees, the defense of pro-

The opinions of each interest group prevented the implementation of a single regulator (recommendation proposed in the White Paper) by raising accounting discrepancies due to business activity (all banks are subject to regulations that adapt the international one, regardless of whether or not they form a a group issuing securities) and by its public or private nature (thus, for example, the PGC of the sector public allows the revaluation of tangible fixed assets, although this option has not been used to date). This is due to the great power of other regulators , such as the Bank of Spain , the CNMV and the IGAE, which have exercised great influence (second ~~ed~~ in the 2 processes analyzed) of a coercive nature over the entities that regulate, and mimetic regarding the development of the White Paper and the PGC. Other professionals believed that this diversity was justified by the specificity of the field of action of each regulator.

• Also highlight the politics adjectived by interviewees as

" low cost " that has characterized the financing of the White Paper and PGC Commissions of 2007 , in which there were no economic or academic incentives for the " best " to be on the commissions . In the words of one of the interviewees,

« There is a lot of work to do; "The most burned people have already left ICAC . "

Based on our analysis, we can consider that the process of transformation of the regulatory framework of accounting in Spain is the ~~sub~~influences , of a coercive, normative and mimetic nature . Predominantly , it has been forces of a coercive nature

that have designed the structure and have given content to the new accounting regulation in our country . The rules emanating from the EU, as well as the influence of the ICAC in the process of development and preparation of the PGC, support this statement. In this sense, our results are in line with what has been observed in contexts as different as the case of the United States and the adoption of certain accounting standards by states (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). On the other hand, there have been influences of a mimetic nature, mainly thanks to the influence of the IASB, the Bank of Spain and the CNMV . In the case of the Bank of Spain and the CNMV , their advantageous position in relation to international regulations in their respective areas of action made them “ leaders ” to imitate as a way of reducing uncertainty regarding the adoption/adaptation process international standards. The forces linked to normative isomorphism have been mainly represented by associations of academics (especially AECA) and other professionals (eg, professional corporations of auditors). It should be noted that the influence of the former has been significantly greater than that of the latter, especially in relation to their active participation in the process. Likewise , the example of the influence academics' regulations illustrate how such influence varies over time: while their contributions are important in the preparation of the White Paper, their contribution in the preparation phase of the PGC is significantly reduced. This result regarding the influence of professionals in the accounting reform in Spain contrasts notably with that found in previous works, such as Covalleski, Dirsmith and Rittenberg (2003) , in which they demonstrate that the influence of the profession — and therefore, the forces linked to normative isomorphism—can prevail over coercive actions.

Lastly, we would like to comment that our analysis leads us to a greater understanding of the process that governs the regulation of accounting in Spain currently in force. In this sense, and given the relatively stable nature of the interest groups involved in the

process, we consider that This work sheds light on the current and future process of changes in accounting regulation . _ As an example , it is worth mentioning that this approach is applicable to

May 2006 Publication of the *Bill to reform and adapt commercial legislation on accounting matters for its international harmonization based on European Union regulations*

February 2007 Publication of the first draft of the new PGC

Approval of Law *16/2007 , of July 4 , on reform and*

process of preparation and approval of the Standards for the Formulation of Consolidated Annual Accounts (NOFCAC). The groups identified here have acted in this process, so an analysis could be carried out of the type and degree of influence exerted by each of them . With this , this work also demonstrates the usefulness of institutional theory for the analysis of changes in regulation .

adaptation of commercial legislation on accounting matters

for international harmonization based on European Union regulations _

Publication of the second draft of the new PGC Publication of a *Draft Royal Decree* for the definitive publication of the PGC and its entry into force simultaneously with Law 16/2007. Publication of the draft PGC for SMEs



accounting in environments other than the Anglo-Saxon one.

There are several aspects not investigated in this article that could lead to future work. One of the topics of interest would be comparison of the existing institutional processes behind the accounting reform in the EU Member States and those followed by a private institution such as the IASB. As an example of the very different reactions that decisions regarding draft standards can cause, note the negative comments that the ICAC received when it published the draft PGC of 2007, when in the case of the IASB the first draft of an IASB standard (*exposure draft*) is public from the first moment and remains in public consultation for periods .

Bibliography

Economic News . (2008). *The auditors abide by the new General Accounting Plan , although we see it as deficient and hasty. Print edition , 64, 01/24.*

Bealing, W. E. (1994). Actions speak louder than words: An institutional perspective on the Securities and Exchange Commission . Accounting, Organizations and Society , 19 , 555–567.

Bealing, W. E., Dirsmith, M. W., & Fogarty, T. (1996). Early regulatory actions by the SEC: An institutional theory perspective on the dramaturgy of political exchanges . Accounting, Organizations and Society , 21 , 317–338.

Can˜ibano, L. and Gisbert, A. (2008). The accounting reform in Spain : main developments . _ _ In Accounting Reform 2008 (1) Scope and Legal Framework , 17-28 . Madrid: KPMG. Expansion-AECA.

Can˜ibano, L. and Herranz, F. (2009). Banking provisions and accounting standards . _

AECA Counselors , 59–63.

Can˜ibano, L. and Ucieda, JL (2005). Accounting and financial reporting in Spain. In L. Can˜ibano and A. Mora (Eds.), Readings on European Accounting (pp. 19–55). Madrid: AECA.

Carmona, S. and Macías, M. (2001). Institutional pressures. monopolistic conditions and the implementation of early cost management practices: The case of the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville (1820-1887). Abacus , 37 (2), 139–165.



Carpenter, V.L., & Feroz, E.H. (1992). GAAP as a symbol of legitimacy — New York State's decision to adopt generally accepted accounting principles. Accounting, Organizations and Society , 17 , 613–643.

Carpenter, V.L., & Feroz, E.H. (2001). Institutional theory and accounting rule choice: An analysis of four US state governments' decisions to adopt generally accepted accounting principles. Accounting, Organizations and Society , 26 , 565–596.

Cea, J. L. (2002). On the threshold of the reform of Spanish accounting regulation in the face of the adaptation of the IASB model : Some reflections from a partial but substantial dissidence with the White Paper of the reform . Financial Studies . Journal of Accounting and Taxation , 236 , 153–198.

Cea, J. L. (2005). The conceptual framework of the IASB accounting model : a critical view of the Spanish accounting reform . _ _ _ _ Madrid: Center for Financial Studies .



Cinco Días (10/16/2007). Accounting reform or revolution [cited April 23 2013]. Available at: <http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/opinion/reforma-accounting-revolution/20071016cdscdiopi 1/>

Cinco Días (12/21/2007). Lights and shadows of the General Accounting Plan [consulted Apr 25 , 2013]. Available at: <http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/opinion/luces-shadows-plan-general-contable/20071221cdscdiopi 4/>

Cinco Días (3/23/2007). Congress will oversee the new simplified plan for SMEs [cited April 24, 2013]. Available at: <http://www.cincodias.com/article/economy/congress-supervise-new-simplified-accounting-plan-SMEs/20070323cdscdieco 8/>

Cinco Días (11/28/2007). The ICAC supervision system is outdated [cited April 25, 2013]. Available at: <http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/companies/supervision-system-icac-superado/20071128cdscdiemp 30/>

*Collin, S. Y., Tagesson, T., Andersson, A., Cato, J. , & Hansson, K. (2009). Explaining the choice of accounting standards in municipal corporations: Positive accounting theory and institutional theory as competitive or concurrent theories. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* , 20 , 141–174.*

European Commission (2000). The European Union Strategy on financial information : The way forward . Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament.



COM (2000) 359 final, Brussels, June 13, 2000 [cited Feb 3, 2015]. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0359&from=ES>

Covaleski, M., & Dirsmith, M. (1988). An institutional perspective on the rise, social transformation and the fall of a university budget category. Administrative Science Quarterly , 33 (4), 562–587.

Covaleski, M., Dirsmith, M., & Rittenberg, L. (2003). Jurisdictional disputes over professional work: The institutionalization of the global knowledge expert. Accounting, Organizations and Society , 28 , 323–355.

Cubillo-Valverde, C. (1973). Creation, structure and characteristics of the General Accounting Plan . Spanish Journal of Financing and Accounting , II (4), 32–58 .

Cubillo-Valverde, C. (1976). The Accounting Planning Institute . Spanish Magazine _ _ _ of Financing and Accounting , V (18), 17–26.

Session Log (02/27/2007). (2007). General Courts . Diary of Sessions of the Council return of the Deputies. Commissions. Year 2007 VIII Legislature n . _ _ ° 764. Economy and Finance. Session no. ° 40, held on Tuesday , February 27 , Madrid .

DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorp hism and collective rationality in



organizational fields. American Sociological Review , 48 (1), 147–160.

Expansion (09/28/2006). The Government postpones the accounting reform for a year in the face of strong criticism. Printed edition, 34.

Expansion (07/26/2007). Companies confront Solbes for ignoring _ _ _ its criteria in the accounting plan [cited Jan 23 , 2015]. Available ble at: <http://www.expansion.com/2007/07/26/economia-politica/economia/1020773.html>

Expansion (12/18/2007). The final gear of a common financial language. Edition printed, 14.

Expansion (04/10/2008). Accounting is not there to solve crises nor should it affect to the decisions of businessmen. Printed edition, 33.

Fogarty, T.J. (1992). Financial accounting standard setting as an institutionalized action field: Constraints, opportunities and dilemmas. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy , 11 , 331–355.

Fogarty, T. J., Heian, J. B., & Knutson, D. L. (1991). The rationality of doing 'nothing': Auditors' responses to legal liability in an institutionalized environment. Critical Perspectives on Accounting , 2 , 201–226.



- García-Lorenzo, R., Velar-Martín, L. A. and Can˜adas-Sánchez, A. F. (2009). *Analysis of the financial statements in the new PGC 2008* . Madrid: ESIC.
- Gelard, G. (2004). *What can be expected from accounting standards? Accounting in Europe* , 1 , 17–20.
- Giner, B. (1997). *The influence of companies' characteristics and accounting regulations tion on information disclosure by Spanish firms. European Accounting Review* , 6 (1), 45–68.
- Giner, B. (1998). *Background and evolution of accounting regulation in Spain* . _ _ *Accounting Technique , Extraordinary Volume Fiftieth Anniversary Accounting Technique* , 457–470.
- Giner, B. and Arce, M. (2012). *Lobbying in accounting standards: Evidence from IFRS 2 on share-based payments. European Accounting Review* , 21 (4), 655–691.
- Giner, B. (2014). *Institutions and interests in conflict with accounting regulation _ International: the case of the Spanish financial sector* . *Accounting Review* , 17 (2), 143–152.
- Gonzalo Angulo J.A. (2002a). *Report on the current situation of accounting in Spain and basic lines to address its reform (White Paper for the reform of Accounting in Spain)*. Madrid: ICAC [cited 27 Apr 2013]. Available at: <http://inza.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/icac-libro-blanco-contabilidad.pdf>



Gonzalo Angulo, JA (2002). The basic lines of the accounting reform . Double Entry , 136 , 10–27.

Gonzalo Angulo, JA (2003). White Paper for the reform of accounting in _ Spain and corporate governance . _ Valencian Journal of Economy and Finance , 7 (I), 9–22.

Gonzalo-Angulo, J. A. (2014). The Spanish accounting reform of 2007 : a balance sheet .

Journal of Accounting , 17 (2), 183–200.

Hopwood, A. (1994). Some reflections on 'The harmonization of accounting within the EU'. European Accounting Review , 3 (2), 241–253.

Process Report. (2007). Preliminary considerations of the General Council of Colleges of Economists and the Superior Council of Colleges of Commercial Owners on the status and process of reform of the accounting model of companies